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Michael Tonry

Fifty Years of American
Sentencing Reform:
Nine Lessons
Major turbulence in American sentencing policy began 50 years ago,
more or less. At the latest, it began in 1975, when Maine abolished parole
release and became the ﬁrst determinate sentencing state since the early
1930s. Earlier dates are also plausible. Don M. Gottfredson and Leslie T.
Wilkins began foundational work on parole guidelines in the mid-1960s.
Their efforts led successively to the US Parole Board’s path-breaking release guidelines, the ﬁrst voluntary sentencing guidelines in Vermont and
Colorado, and presumptive guidelines in Minnesota and elsewhere. Another possibility is 1969, when, in Discretionary Justice, Kenneth Culp
Davis, America’s leading administrative law scholar, disparaged the lack
of basic fairness in the criminal justice system. Or 1971, when the American Friends Service Committee’s Struggle for Justice decried racial injustice and sentencing disparities and blamed indeterminate sentencing. Or
1973, when Judge Marvin Frankel’s Criminal Sentences: Law without Order
condemned judicial “lawlessness” and proposed creation of an administrative agency to set standards for sentencing. National newspapers and public affairs journals seldom review scholarly books on specialized subjects.
These they did.
Sentencing reform was in the air. There was wide agreement about the
problems. Judges had unreviewable authority to set sentences and parole
boards to release prisoners. Among the results, critics contended, were
idiosyncratic and racially biased decisions, unjust and unwarranted disparities, and procedural unfairness. Support for change was bipartisan. Civil
liberties, civil rights, and prisoners’ rights groups, and political liberals
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generally, focused on disparities, unfairness, and racial bias. Police and prosecutors’ organizations, and political conservatives generally, focused on
unwarranted leniency, inconsistency, and insufﬁcient emphasis on crime
prevention.1
The result was a law reform explosion that rivaled the nineteenthcentury inventions of the reformatory, the prison, parole, probation, and
the juvenile court. Together they constituted the indeterminate sentencing systems that critics disdained. Since 1975, American jurisdictions
have established statutory sentencing standards; enacted mandatory minimum sentence, truth in sentencing, and life without parole laws; created
parole and sentencing guidelines systems; and abolished parole release.
Together those initiatives constitute determinate sentencing.
Big differences distinguish indeterminate from determinate sentencing. The former extended broad authority to ofﬁcials so they could make
individualized decisions in every case; the latter narrowed or eliminated
ofﬁcials’ discretion. Supporters of indeterminate sentencing viewed offenders as malleable and their crimes as products of adverse social and
environmental conditions. Many supporters of determinate sentencing
viewed human nature as ﬁxed and crimes as products of immorality,
greed, and lack of self-discipline. Indeterminate sentencing rested on the
idea that most offenders should and can be rehabilitated, and the incorrigible few incapacitated. Determinate sentencing rests on the idea that
the primary purpose of sentencing is to assure that offenders receive the
punishments they deserve.
The new policies and institutions involved fundamental changes in traditional ways of doing business. They coincided with enormous expansion of government and foundation support for criminal justice research
and correspondingly large increases in the numbers of university departments and scholarly specialists in criminology. No one knows how many
research projects, evaluations, and PhD theses on sentencing and corrections have been completed in the past 50 years. Tens of thousands
is a realistic estimate.
1
Rothman (1971, 1980) provided the classic historical accounts of the origins, operations, and chronic problems of indeterminate sentencing. Besides the seminal works mentioned in the text, a number of inﬂuential liberal (e.g., Morris 1974; Dershowitz 1976; von
Hirsch 1976) and conservative (e.g., Fleming 1974; van den Haag 1975; Wilson 1975)
books offered overlapping critiques of indeterminate sentencing but proposed substantially
different solutions. The richest accounts of the left/right, due process/crime control coalitions favoring the shift to determinate sentencing describe early changes in California
(Messenger and Johnson 1978; Parnas and Salerno 1978) and Pennsylvania and Minnesota
(Martin 1984).
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Given the scale and diversity of the changes, and the proliferation of
efforts to assess their effects, we should know a great deal about what
works, what doesn’t, and in each case why. We know less than we should,
but we know a lot. Nine lessons, summarized in table 1, stand out.

TABLE 1
Sentencing Reform, Nine Lessons
1. Sentencing
Guidelines
2. Mandatory
Sentences

3. Federal
Sentencing
4. Racial
Disparities

5. Predicting
Dangerousness

6. Case Processing

7. Punishments

8. Parole Release

9. Luck and
Leadership

Presumptive sentencing guidelines developed by sentencing
commissions are the most effective means to improve consistency,
reduce disparity, and control corrections spending.
Mandatory sentencing laws should be repealed, and no new ones
enacted; they produce countless injustices, encourage cynical
circumventions, and seldom achieve demonstrable reductions
in crime.
Federal sentencing guidelines have been remarkably unsuccessful;
they should be rebuilt from the ground up.
Black and Hispanic defendants are more likely than whites and
Asians to be sentenced to imprisonment, and for longer; presumptive sentencing guidelines reduced racial disparities initially
and over time, but most states do not have presumptive guidelines.
Use of predictions of dangerousness to determine who is imprisoned
and for how long is unjust; predictive accuracy has improved little
in 50 years, and current methods too often lengthen prison terms
of people who would not have committed violent crimes.
Efforts to standardize sentences and eliminate disparities in a state or
the federal system cannot succeed; distinctive practices and norms,
diverse local cultures, and practical and political needs of ofﬁcials
and agencies assure major local differences in sentencing practice.
Many community correctional programs can reduce reoffending,
improve offenders’ and their families’ lives, and compared with
imprisonment reduce public expenditure; imprisonment increases
reoffending, damages prisoners and their families, and wastes
enormous amounts of money.
Except in the handful of states that have effective systems of presumptive sentencing guidelines, parole release is an essential
component of a just and cost-effective sentencing system in the
United States.
Some sentencing systems and policies are demonstrably superior to
others. Whether they are successful often depends, alas, on auspicious circumstances and the involvement of unusually effective
leaders.
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1. SENTENCING GUIDELINES.—Presumptive sentencing guidelines developed
by sentencing commissions are the most effective means to improve consistency, reduce disparity, and control corrections spending.
Judge Frankel proposed the establishment of specialized administrative agencies, now usually called sentencing commissions, to develop, promulgate, monitor, and, as needed, revise presumptively applicable guidelines for sentencing. He reasoned that legislatures lack the specialized
knowledge, staff continuity, and attention spans needed to do those things
well and are too vulnerable to day-to-day political and media inﬂuence. He
expected appellate courts to review contested sentences and gradually to
develop a “common law of sentencing” to deal with difﬁcult kinds of cases.
What Judge Frankel proposed worked. Commissions in Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington created presumptive
guidelines systems that established sentencing standards for typical cases,
made the process fairer and more consistent, reduced disparities, including by race and gender, and managed prison population sizes and correctional spending. They accomplished these things in somewhat different
ways and more and less successfully, but showed that presumptive guidelines can remedy many of the problems of indeterminate sentencing.
Richard Frase (2019, p. X), summing up the most exhaustive and authoritative survey of guidelines experience ever published, observes, “The
preguidelines regime of unstructured, highly discretionary sentencing is
unacceptable. Guidelines offer the only proven sentencing reform model.”
Frankel’s was but one of six contending sentencing reform proposals
in the 1970s.2 None of the ﬁve others proved effective. Most were abandoned. The ﬁrst was creation, under judicial leadership, of voluntary
guidelines based on research documenting prior sentencing patterns.
The logic was that judges would want to observe local conventions once
they knew what they were. The second, an alternative to voluntary guide-

2
Blumstein et al. (1983) and Tonry (1996, 2016) through their respective dates summarize the major changes in American sentencing laws and policies and their effects. On sentencing guidelines generally, see Frase (2013, 2019). On the 1970s experience with judgeled voluntary guidelines, see Gottfredson, Wilkins, and Hoffman (1978), Kress (1980),
Rich et al. (1982), and Carrow et al. (1985). On sentencing information systems, see Doob
(1990) and Miller (2004). On sentencing councils, see Zeisel and Diamond (1975). On sentence appeals without guidelines, see Zeisel and Diamond (1977). Shane-Dubow, Brown,
and Olsen (1985) and Austin et al. (1994) provide broader overviews of sentencing policy
changes, including adoption of mandatory sentence laws, through their respective dates.
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lines, was to establish computerized “sentencing information systems”
that judges could consult to learn how they and their colleagues had previously dealt with particular kinds of cases. They were quickly abandoned
everywhere they were tried. The third, adopted in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, and North Carolina, was to amend criminal
codes to specify recommended sentences for typical cases. No other state
enacted a “statutory determinate sentencing law” after 1979, and Colorado and North Carolina repealed theirs. The fourth, without guidelines,
was to create sentence appeal systems, sometimes involving appellate
courts and other times involving “sentencing councils” composed of trial
judges. The ﬁfth was for sentencing commissions rather than judges to
develop voluntary sentencing guidelines systems.
Except for Judge Frankel’s presumptive sentencing guidelines, none of
those efforts demonstrably improved consistency, reduced racial and
other disparities, or effectively controlled correctional resource planning
and spending. The early voluntary guidelines and sentencing information systems failed because, as Anthony Doob observed after evaluating
information systems, “Judges do not, as a rule, care to know what sentences other judges are handing down in comparable cases” (1989, p. 6).
The early appeal systems failed because of “lawlessness.” In the absence
of standards indicating what sentence should ordinarily be imposed,
there was no basis for deciding whether a particular one was appropriate
or not. Some sentences were overturned, but on the ad hoc bases that
they were too severe or inappropriate under the circumstances. Those
rationales are not generalizable and provided little guidance for subsequent cases.
Evaluations of the early voluntary guidelines systems in Colorado,
Vermont, Maryland, and Florida uniformly concluded that they had no
discernible effects on sentencing disparities. Nonetheless, most of the
16 current state systems are voluntary (now usually called “advisory”).
No subsequent research has shown that the newer voluntary systems
have reduced disparities compared with sentencing patterns before their
adoption. Proponents argue that they improve consistency for two reasons: newly appointed judges without prior sentencing experience are socialized into the idea that the guidelines express local conventions, and
over time the guidelines become points of reference around which “going rates” take shape and charging and plea bargaining take place (Ulmer
2019).
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Every American state should establish a sentencing commission and direct it to develop presumptive guidelines, as the recently approved Model
Penal Code—Sentencing proposes (Reitz and Klingele 2019). Auguries are
not promising, however, at least in the short term. The newest of the presumptive guidelines systems, in Kansas and North Carolina, took effect
in 1993 and 1994. Practitioners generally oppose major law reforms for
fear of the unknown, judges oppose presumptive guidelines for fear they
will lose discretion, and prosecutors oppose them for fear they will lose
plea bargaining leverage. Frase (2019, p. X), on the rationale that half a
loaf is better than none, observes, “But even if we can eventually agree
on what an ideal guidelines system should look like, some jurisdictions
will be unable or unwilling to adopt all of its features. In some, an incomplete system may be ‘as good as it gets.’ Such guidelines may be better
than if there were no guidelines at all.”
2. MANDATORY SENTENCES.—Mandatory sentencing laws should be repealed,
and no new ones enacted; they produce countless injustices, encourage cynical circumventions, and seldom achieve demonstrable reductions in crime.
Mandatory sentencing laws are a fundamentally bad idea.3 From
eighteenth-century England, when pickpockets worked the crowds at
hangings of pickpockets and juries refused to convict people of offenses
subject to severe punishments, to twenty-ﬁrst-century America, the evidence has been clear. Mandatory minimum sentences have few, if any,
discernible deterrent effects and, because of their rigidity, result in unjustly harsh punishments in many cases and willful circumvention by prosecutors, judges, and juries in others. In our time, when plea bargaining is
ubiquitous, mandatories are routinely used to coerce guilty pleas, sometimes from innocent people ( Johnson 2019).
In the 1950s, the American Bar Foundation undertook the most extensive research ever conducted on day-to-day operations of American crim-

3
The classic summaries of the historical evidence are Michael and Wechsler (1940) and
Hay (1975). The most comprehensive studies of day-to-day use of mandatories were carried out in the 1950s for the American Bar Foundation and published in the 1960s (Newman 1966; Dawson 1969). I have several times summarized the 1950s–90s case studies
(e.g., Tonry 2016) and other countries’ limited experience (Tonry 2009, 2012). The authoritative surveys of research on deterrent effects are National Academy of Sciences
reports (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). Comprehensive recent surveys of the evidence include Chalﬁn and McCrary (2017) and Tonry
(2018b).
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inal courts. They learned that prosecutors applied mandatories selectively
and that judges and juries refused to convict when penalties seemed too
severe. Frank Remington, who directed the project, observed in 1969, “Legislative prescription of a high mandatory sentence for certain offenders is
likely to result in a reduction in charges at the prosecution stage, or if this
is not done, by a refusal of the judge to convict at the adjudication stage.
The issue . . . thus is not solely whether certain offenders should be dealt
with severely, but also how the criminal justice system will accommodate
to the legislative charge” (1969, p. xvii). A large number of sophisticated
case processing studies in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s reached the same
conclusion.
The evidence on deterrent effects is equally damning. Countless authoritative surveys, in many countries, have concluded that mandatories’
deterrent effects are modest at best. National Academy of Sciences reports in 1978 and 2014 serve as contemporary bookends. The 1978 Panel
on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects concluded, “In summary . . . we cannot assert that the evidence warrants an afﬁrmative conclusion regarding deterrence” (Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978, p. 7).
The 2014 Committee on the Causes and Consequences of High Rates
of Incarceration similarly observed that “knowledge about mandatory
minimum sentences has changed remarkably little in the past 30 years.
Their ostensible primary rationale is deterrence. The overwhelming weight
of the evidence, however, shows that they have few if any deterrent effects. . . . Existing knowledge is too fragmentary [and] estimated effects
are so small or contingent on particular circumstances as to have no practical relevance for policy making” (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014,
p. 83).
Contemporary research thus conﬁrms long-standing cautions against
enactment of mandatory sentencing laws. Their use to coerce guilty pleas
is new and distinctive to our times. Even innocent defendants are sorely
tempted to plead guilty and accept probation or a short prison term rather
than risk a mandatory 10- or 20-year sentence. The late Harvard Law
School professor William Stuntz observed that “outside the plea bargaining process” prosecutors’ threats to ﬁle charges subject to mandatories
“would be deemed extortionate” (2011, p. 260). Federal Court of Appeals
Judge Gerald Lynch similarly observed that prosecutors’ power to threaten
mandatories has enabled them to displace judges from their traditional
role: It is “the prosecutor who decides what sentence the defendant should
be given in exchange for his plea” (2003, p. 1404). American sentencing
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has become more severe in recent decades; prosecutors bear much of the
responsibility ( Johnson 2019).
This is a uniquely American problem. Nothing similar occurs in any
other developed country. It has two causes. One is that American prosecutors are elected or appointed by elected politicians; elsewhere they
are nonpartisan career civil servants. The second is that, under US constitutional law, prosecutors’ day-to-day decisions are almost never subject to judicial review. American prosecutors have the same interests
and motives, however, as other elected politicians to curry favor with
the electorate and the media. In recent “tough-on-crime” decades, prosecutors have favored severe punishments.
This is not how things are supposed to work. Until mandatory sentencing laws proliferated, prosecutors ﬁled charges and presented evidence, judges with or without juries decided whether the evidence justiﬁed a conviction, and judges imposed sentences. This division of labor
made sense and remains the norm in other Western countries.
American prosecutors are adversaries. Their aims are to achieve convictions and, often, severe punishments. Mandatory sentencing laws increased their power to do both. Offers to dismiss charges subject to mandatories are often too good to refuse; that is why many fewer cases go to
trial than in earlier times. In tried cases resulting in convictions, judges
have no legally legitimate way to do anything but impose at least the mandated punishment.
Prosecutors in other countries are expected, like judges, to focus equally
on conviction of the guilty and exoneration of those whose guilt cannot
be proven. American prosecutors are seldom so evenhanded. Their adversary role and foreseeable identiﬁcation with victims make personal animus toward many defendants likely and psychologically understandable.
Personal political interests, especially in controversial or notorious cases,
exacerbate those tendencies. Those are reasons why judges, not prosecutors, should set sentences. Good judges should be above the battle—
unemotional, impartial, and motivated to do justice. That may sometimes
be difﬁcult, but good judges try. Because of the coercive power of mandatories, the avenging prosecutor often displaces the neutral judge.
Every authoritative law reform organization that has examined American sentencing in the last 50 years has proposed elimination of mandatory minimum sentence laws. These included, in earlier times, the 1967
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, the 1971 National Commission on Reform of Federal Laws,
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the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, the 1979 Model Sentencing and Corrections Act proposed by
the Uniform Law Commissioners, and the American Bar Association’s
1994 Sentencing Standards. The American Law Institute’s Model Penal
Code—Sentencing offered the same recommendation in 2017 (Reitz and
Klingele 2019).
3. FEDERAL SENTENCING.—Federal sentencing guidelines have been remarkably unsuccessful; they should be rebuilt from the ground up.
The federal guidelines were the most controversial and disliked sentencing reform initiative in American history. Within 2 years of their taking effect, more than 200 federal district judges invalidated the guidelines
and declared all or part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 unconstitutional. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), however, the
US Supreme Court rejected the lower courts’ holdings. Little changed
until the Court in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), reversed course,
declaring major parts of the 1984 act unconstitutional after all and converting the guidelines from “mandatory,” as the federal sentencing commission called them, to “advisory.”
The federal guidelines’ failure is ironic; prospects for success could not
have been better. Senate Bill 2699, introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy in 1975, was the ﬁrst legislative proposal for a sentencing commission anywhere. The bill, developed by Yale Law School faculty in collaboration with Judge Frankel, quickly obtained bipartisan support; the
Senate approved it several times. When the 1984 act took effect, the future looked rosy. The commission had a staff of 70 (state commissions
had ﬁve to 10), a correspondingly large budget, and the good fortune that
Kay A. Knapp, director of the successful Minnesota commission, signed
on as executive director.
After that, it was all downhill. The initial commission was poorly led
and faction-ridden. Knapp was forced out within months. The commission made no effort to learn from the experiences of existing commissions in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Most importantly,
although Frankel viewed administrative agencies’ partial insulation from
political inﬂuence as a key element—and beneﬁt—of his proposal, the
commission and key commissioners openly pursued personal and partisan political ends. The “tough-on-crime” politics of the 1980s displaced
the original goals of reduced disparities and greater fairness.

10

Michael Tonry

Detailed discussions of how and why the guidelines proved so unsuccessful and unpopular are available elsewhere.4 They were too severe, too
complex, and too detailed. Most sitting federal judges hated them. The
guidelines nearly eliminated the use of probation as a federal sanction.
Half of federal offenders received probation before the guidelines took
effect; 7 percent did in 2017. The commission’s unprecedented “relevant
conduct” policy required sentencing judges to take account of alleged
crimes that were not prosecuted or that resulted in acquittals.
Federal judges in recent years have imposed sentences that fall within
applicable guideline ranges about half of the time. Paul Hofer (2019), in
the most exhaustive analysis to date of federal sentencing data, concludes
that sentencing disparities, including racial disparities, are probably
greater now than before the guidelines took effect. The existence of numerous mandatory sentencing laws in the federal system is part of the
explanation, but the US Sentencing Commission deserves most of the
blame.
The federal guidelines are not salvageable. Fundamental problems result from decisions made when they were initially developed. The US
Sentencing Commission’s guidelines are much too detailed. They divide
offense severity into 43 categories; most states use eight to 12. They attempt to micromanage judges’ decisions concerning the pertinence of offenders’ personal characteristics and backgrounds; state guidelines simply identify aggravating and mitigating characteristics judges may take
into account, among others, when they believe it appropriate. They authorize probationary sentences for only 5–7 percent of federal offenders;
states authorize use of probation for any offender not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence law. Finally, they direct judges to increase
sentences on the basis of “relevant conduct” whether or not it was proven
at trial or admitted, including conduct occurring in crimes of which the
offender was acquitted. No state guidelines contain a comparable provision.
Those provisions are straitjackets. Just, fair, and accountable sentencing will remain an impossible dream in federal courts until they are repu-

4
Stith and Cabranes (1998) and Tonry (1996, 2016) provide the fullest historical accounts
including detailed discussions of the federal guidelines’ major provisions, their rationales,
and the controversies they generated. US Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer (1988,
1999) provided spirited apologia.
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diated. If and when that happens, state experience can guide a new commission in creating a new system of federal guidelines.
4. RACIAL DISPARITIES.—Black and Hispanic defendants are more likely than
whites and Asians to be sentenced to imprisonment, and for longer; presumptive sentencing guidelines reduced racial disparities initially and over
time, but most states do not have presumptive guidelines.
Racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing and imprisonment continue
to be an American dilemma.5 They have been common throughout American history. Racial disparities among prison inmates in the twentieth century increased slowly through the 1970s and then rose rapidly through the
early 1990s. At the peak, the imprisonment rate for black Americans was
eight times higher than the white rate. In our time, black and Hispanic
offenders, compared with whites, are more likely to receive prison sentences, and for longer. In jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines, minority defendants receive mitigated sentences less often than whites and are
more likely than whites to receive sentences at the top of the applicable
guideline range. Minority offenders are less likely to be sentenced to community punishments than whites or to receive early release from prison.
The explanations are complex and simple. The ﬁrst simple one is that
judges react differently to minority offenders. In earlier times, racial bias
and stereotyping were major reasons. In our time, implicit racial biases
and no doubt some invidious bias remain part of the problem. The second simple explanation is that deeply disadvantaged backgrounds more
often characterize minority offenders than whites. Many judges believe
disadvantaged offenders are especially likely to reoffend and thus should
be punished more severely.
The complex reasons involve the nature of American sentencing laws.
Legislatures enacted laws that mandated especially severe sentences for
crimes of which disproportionately large numbers of minority offenders
are convicted. The mandatory minimum sentence, three-strikes, dangerous offender, truth in sentencing, and life without parole laws enacted in
the 1980s and 1990s targeted violent and drug crimes. Relatively more
5
Classic early sources include Du Bois (1899), Sellin (1935), and Myrdal (1944). Tonry
(1995, 2011) and Travis, Western, and Redburn (2014, chap. 2) provide comprehensive
overviews of knowledge concerning racial disparities in imprisonment since 1970. The
best surveys of research on sentencing disparities through their respective dates are
Mitchell (2005), Baumer (2013), Spohn (2015), and King and Light (2019).
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minority than white people commit violent crimes—though the difference is declining. Making punishments more severe for violent crimes
necessarily affected more minority than white offenders. Some might argue that concern about victims of violence justiﬁes harsher punishments.
Others disagree, noting the effects on minority offenders of discrimination, police practices, and structural disadvantage.
There is no equivalent debate to be had about drug crimes. Minority citizens neither use illicit drugs nor engage in trafﬁcking more than whites.
They are, however, much more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, and
convicted. The reasons are that police drug enforcement targets innercity neighborhoods, that minority citizens are vastly—eight to 10 times—
more likely than whites to be stopped on the street, and that prosecutors
less often divert minority arrestees from prosecution. Racial proﬁling is a
big part of the story.
Critics of American drug policy note that governmental responses to
the crack and heroin outbreaks of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s emphasized arrests and harsh punishments that disproportionately ensnared
minority citizens. Responses to the recent methamphetamine and heroin
epidemics, mostly involving white users and sellers, emphasize treatment, education, and other public health and social welfare solutions.
Go ﬁgure.
The disparate effects of seemingly neutral laws on members of racial
and ethnic groups are a major cause of racial disparities in imprisonment.
The classic example, which ﬁlled federal prisons with black prisoners,
was the 100-to-1 law that punished low-level sellers of 5 grams of crack,
mostly black, as severely as major sellers, mostly white, of 500 grams of
powder cocaine. It is now an 18-to-1 law and continues to punish blacks
more severely than whites. Similar laws survive in many American states.
Few mandatory sentencing laws for violent and drug crimes have been
repealed or substantially narrowed. As long as they survive, racial disparities will remain endemic.
Disparities have slightly declined. The black/white difference in imprisonment rates in recent years has been about 4∶1 (higher for males).
This resulted partly from major declines in prosecutions for drug crimes.
The news about racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing is good and
bad. The good part is that they have declined in jurisdictions with strong
guidelines systems (King and Light 2019). The bad part is that only a few
jurisdictions have strong guidelines. Elsewhere business continues as
usual.
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There are some easy partial solutions to the racial disparities problems.
One is to repeal all mandatory minimum sentence and similar laws. They
are the principal drivers of mass incarceration and of racial disparities in
imprisonment. The second is to create enforceable mechanisms to prohibit racial proﬁling. The third is to double and redouble efforts to educate police, prosecutors, judges, and other ofﬁcials about explicit and implicit bias. It is humanly understandable, even if regrettable, that ofﬁcials
react with greater empathy toward people whose lives they understand,
but it is fundamentally unjust. The fourth is to undertake racial impact
studies throughout the criminal justice system to learn whether laws, policies, and practices do disproportionate damage to members of particular groups and to reconsider the justiﬁability of those that do (Reitz and
Klingele 2019).
5. PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS.—Use of predictions of dangerousness to determine who is imprisoned and for how long is unjust; predictive accuracy
has improved little in 50 years, and current methods too often lengthen
prison terms of people who would not have committed violent crimes.
Use of predictions of dangerousness has proliferated throughout the
criminal justice system from bail to prison release.6 They have no morally
justiﬁable role to play in sentencing (Tonry 2019). They do have appropriate correctional uses in classifying offenders for admission to treatment programs. Three sets of problems bedevil use of predictions in sentencing.
First, they are seldom very accurate. Violence is rare, even among
known offenders. Predicting rare events is inherently difﬁcult. As a result, violence predictions are more often inaccurate than accurate. Norval Morris (1974) and John Monahan (1981) in inﬂuential early syntheses concluded that predictions of future violence were wrong two-thirds
of the time. “‘Dangerousness,’” Morris wrote, “must be rejected for [sentencing], since it presupposes a capacity to predict future criminal behavior quite beyond our present technical ability” (1974, p. 62). Locking up

6
Particularly insightful analyses of ethical and technical issues by proponents of use of
predictions include Monahan and Skeem (2016), Monahan (2017), Berk et al. (2018), and
Berk (2019). The leading meta-analyses of research on the accuracy and reliability of violence prediction instruments are Campbell, French, and Gendreau (2009), Yang, Wong,
and Coid (2010), and Fazel et al. (2012); they offer remarkably similar conclusions.

14

Michael Tonry

three people predicted to be violent when only one will be is, he said,
deeply unjust.
The technology of violence prediction is vastly more sophisticated than
it was four decades ago. One might expect that violence predictions today
would be vastly more accurate. They aren’t.
The most inﬂuential meta-analysis on violence prediction analyzed research on the nine most commonly used instruments. It concluded that
positive violence predictions are correct, on average, 42 percent of the
time (Fazel et al. 2012; Fazel 2019). Morris, recall, was troubled that only
one-third of positive predictions (two of six) were correct. Forty-two percent accuracy, put differently, is two of ﬁve. The false positives are disproportionately black and other minority offenders (Angwin et al. 2016).
As in Morris’s time, substantially more than half of people predicted to
be violent in our time will not be.
Two leading meta-analyses explicitly conclude that positive predictions of violence are too inaccurate to be used in sentencing:
Because of their moderate level of predictive efﬁcacy, they should not
be used as the sole or primary means for clinical or criminal justice
decision making that is contingent on a high level of predictive accuracy, such as preventive detention. (Yang, Wong, and Coid 2010,
p. 761)
These tools are not sufﬁcient on their own for the purposes of risk
assessment. . . . The current level of evidence is not sufﬁciently strong
for deﬁnitive decisions on sentencing, parole, and release or discharge
to be made solely using these tools. (Fazel et al. 2012, pp. 5, 6)
The second problem concerns variables used in prediction instruments. Most use characteristics such as youth and gender that are per
se unjust. Like eye color or height, they are matters over which individuals have no control and for which they are not morally responsible.
Gender in most settings is simply not an acceptable basis for distinguishing between people. Nor is youth. Common practice in all Western countries, consistently with ﬁndings of recent neurological and developmental research, calls for treating young offenders more sympathetically than
adults, and less severely.
All prediction instruments incorporate socioeconomic variables such
as marital status, employment record, education, and residential stability
that are not the state’s business. These are quintessentially personal choices;
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people in free societies are entitled to make those decisions for themselves and not to suffer because of the choices they make. On all of these
socioeconomic factors, minority offenders fare less well than whites.
Their use causes and aggravates invidious disparities.
The third problem is that all prediction instruments incorporate criminal history variables that are inﬂated for black and other minority offenders by racially biased and disparate practices and racial proﬁling
(Starr 2014). Group differences in some criminal history variables—including age at ﬁrst arrest, custody status, and numbers of prior arrests,
convictions, and punishments—result in substantial part from racial proﬁling and police targeting of poor and minority neighborhoods and individuals. Young black and Hispanic people are arrested at younger ages
than whites, and more often. Schools expel more minority than white
students for conduct problems and refer more to the police. Police drug
enforcement targets substances sold by minority drug dealers and places
where they sell them. All of these practices exaggerate the criminal records of minority individuals compared with other people.
Use of predictions of dangerousness in sentencing thus cannot be justiﬁed either empirically or morally. To many people, however, it is intuitively plausible. It expresses sympathy toward hypothetical future victims and disdain for people believed—usually incorrectly—to be likely
to be violent. What to do?
The best answer is to abandon use of violence predictions in sentencing. Prevention of crime is an important public policy goal, but so are justice, fairness, and equal treatment. Each derives from fundamental ideas
about human dignity. Each should limit the exercise of state power over
individual lives. Predictive sentencing, by contrast, sacriﬁces the lives of
individuals in order to protect hypothetical victims.
Law and order politics and prevailing emotionalism may make elimination of preventive sentencing unachievable. A less morally justiﬁable
but more saleable option is to establish limits on increments of additional
punishment that can be imposed, for example, sentences to conﬁnement
not more than 20 or 30 percent longer than would otherwise be ordered.
Monahan (2017) and the Model Penal Code—Sentencing propose use of
predictions as a basis only for mitigation of sentences and never for aggravation. BUT—a big but—Monahan’s proposal can work only if there
are strong meaningful limits on sentencing severity, from which the mitigated sentence offers a reduction. This might be achievable in the handful of jurisdictions with presumptive sentencing guidelines systems. Oth-
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erwise, and elsewhere, nothing would stop judges and prosecutors from
using predictions to reduce sentences for low-risk offenders and increase
them for high-risk offenders.
6. CASE PROCESSING.—Efforts to standardize sentences and eliminate disparities in a state or the federal system cannot succeed; distinctive practices
and norms, diverse local cultures, and practical and political needs of ofﬁcials and agencies assure major local differences in sentencing practice.
It is impossible to micromanage sentencing decisions successfully
throughout a state or the federal system. Sentencing will be fairer, more
just, and more rational when legislators and other political ofﬁcials acknowledge this. Those who were judges, prosecutors, or defense lawyers
earlier in their careers know it even if for political reasons they act as if
they do not. Only uninformed and naive people believe, and disingenuous people claim to believe, that any criminal law will be consistently and
mechanically applied. Exceptions are inevitable and sometimes are the
norm. The inexorable implication is that sentencing laws should provide
frameworks for decision making and presumptions about decisions, but
never more than that.
There are three reasons. The ﬁrst is that almost all judges, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and correctional ofﬁcials take their jobs seriously. Circumstances of criminal offenses and characteristics of offenders, offenses,
and victims vary enormously. Decent practitioners know this and want to
make, or be involved in making, decisions that are sensible and just under
the particular circumstances, even if applicable laws direct them to make
decisions that are neither sensible nor just. This is why three centuries of
experience and a half century of social science research show that mandatory sentence laws are never applied consistently. Sometimes prescribed punishments that everyone involved believes to be palpably unjust are imposed; often they are not.
The second is that criminal court processes are local. State and federal
legislatures enact criminal laws, but local ofﬁcials apply them. They live
and work in particular places that have distinctive histories, norms, traditions, and political, religious, and legal cultures. That is why big cities,
small towns, suburbs, and rural areas differ in the severity of the punishments their courts impose generally and in particular kinds of cases. That
is why punishments are and long have been far more severe in southeastern than in northeastern states. Stereotyped examples involve compar-
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isons of sentences for theft of lobster traps in Maine or cattle in Nebraska
with sentences for those crimes elsewhere. Those examples, though, can
trivialize a general phenomenon.
Ofﬁcials in culturally and religiously conservative communities are
likely to regard drug, sexual, and violent crimes differently than ofﬁcials
in big cities. Ofﬁcials in rural courts, who know the people whose cases
they process and where caseloads are small, tend to operate differently
than ofﬁcials in anonymous urban settings. Judges, prosecutors, and other
ofﬁcials usually reﬂect prevailing attitudes and beliefs; people new to a
community quickly become socialized into the local culture. Prosecutors
often say their overriding goal is to reﬂect local values in their ofﬁce’s
work. What, therefore, local practitioners believe to be just and sensible
outcomes in individual cases varies from place to place.
The third is that sentencing is a process and not simply a product of
judicial idiosyncrasies. Prosecutors control charging and most dismissals.
Judges control case processing. Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel
interact regularly and develop well-understood conventions and “going
rates” that inform plea bargaining and predict sentences. All of them
work within institutions that have limited resources, policy priorities,
and standard ways of doing business. People who regularly ignore established conventions and others’ institutional interests do not usually get
along. It is business as usual for most cases. Notorious crimes are different, but they are a minuscule fraction of any court’s caseload.
There is nothing new about any of this. It explains the history and research ﬁndings concerning mandatory sentencing. Social scientists studying courts document it.7 An early political science literature on “local legal culture” demonstrated the interplays of local norms, going rates,
institutional interests, and personal idiosyncrasies. A criminology literature on “focal concerns” emphasized practitioners’ needs, and wishes, to
reconcile public safety, offenders’ moral responsibility, and practical institutional interests. A sociology literature on “inhabited institutions”
takes those analyses further to explore interactions among institutions,
of individuals within institutions, and resulting interplays.
7
The classic works on local legal culture are Blumberg (1967), Eisenstein and Jacob (1977),
and Eisenstein, Flemming, and Nardulli (1988). Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) and
Kramer and Ulmer (2009) are foundational to the focal concerns literature. Kramer and Ulmer
(2009) integrate the theories and literatures on focal concerns and local legal cultures. Ulmer
(2019) canvasses the inhabited institutions literature that attempts to explain how and why local
differences matter.
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The bottom line: Courts are local, the people who work in them are
local (or soon socialized into local norms), nearly all victims are local,
and most offenders are local. Laws in books are statewide or national.
Laws in action are local. When law in books conﬂicts with law in action,
small wonder that local norms usually come out on top.
That does not mean that policy changes cannot shape sentencing
outcomes. Passage or repeal of a mandatory sentence law will alter sentencing patterns, though not consistently. Increases and decreases in
sentences speciﬁed in presumptive sentencing guidelines, or in other
guidelines that have become part of the local legal culture, will affect sentencing outcomes. All else being equal, most practitioners want to comply with applicable laws and rules. Plea bargaining takes place in the shadow
of the law or guidelines. The more, however, that laws or guidelines call
on practitioners to behave in ways they believe to be unjust or unnecessary, the less likely they will pay attention.
7. PUNISHMENTS.—Many community correctional programs can reduce reoffending, improve offenders’ and their families’ lives, and compared with
imprisonment reduce public expenditure; imprisonment increases reoffending, damages prisoners and their families, and wastes enormous amounts
of money.
The case for greater use of community punishments is a no-brainer.8
Compared with conﬁnement in a jail or prison, they cost less, are less
likely to lead to future offending, and are more humane. They do less collateral damage to the lives and futures of offenders and their loved ones.
They can be scaled to the seriousness of crimes for which they are imposed. Well-managed, well-targeted, and adequately funded programs
achieve lower reoffending rates. Other Western countries use community
punishments much more, and imprisonment much less, than do American jurisdictions.
8
Cullen, Lero Jonson, and Mears (2017) and Tonry (2018a) provide up-to-date surveys
of knowledge concerning community punishments and their effects. Morris and Tonry
(1990) and MacKenzie (2006) tell the story through their respective dates. Travis, Western, and Redburn (2014) contains authoritative summaries of knowledge concerning the
effects of imprisonment on prisoners, their families, their communities, and public safety.
Nagin, Cullen, and Lero Jonson (2009) and Cullen, Lero Jonson, and Nagin (2011) demonstrate that, all else being equal, imprisonment makes future offending by released
prisoners more, not less, likely.

Fifty Years of American Sentencing Reform

19

There are many effective community punishment programs. These
include victim-offender mediation; diversion from prosecution conditioned on payment of ﬁnes, making restitution, or participating in treatment programs; ﬁnes for nontrivial crimes; suspended prison sentences;
community service; and diverse forms of supervision and communitybased treatment.
Unconditional discharges following conviction and unsupervised probation are important options. In neither instance do convicted offenders
escape punishment. Anyone convicted of crime has endured fear and anxiety. All experience demeaning assembly line case processing. Many spend
time overnight in jail awaiting a preliminary hearing. Many remain in jail
until their cases are resolved. As the title of a classic 1979 book by Malcolm
Feeley declared, for many The Process Is the Punishment.
Unconditional discharges and unsupervised or nominally supervised
probation should be the defaults. Otherwise, probation agencies will
waste scarce resources supervising low-risk offenders. Researchers have
repeatedly shown, and most corrections ofﬁcials believe, that resources
are best devoted to working with higher-risk offenders. Reducing their
likelihood of reoffending is more cost-effective and pays greater crime
prevention dividends.
For offenders for whom supervision makes sense, well-managed, welltargeted, and adequately funded community programs can reduce reoffending. Many hundreds of evaluations show that participants in community punishments, at worst, do no worse than comparable people
sentenced to conﬁnement do. That last ﬁnding means that, except for
the small percentage of unusually dangerous people, the vast sums spent
on imprisonment are—from a crime-prevention perspective—wasted.
A steadily accumulating literature conﬁrms the observation two centuries ago by John Howard, the ﬁrst prominent English prison reformer,
that prisons are “schools for crime.” All else being equal, people sentenced to imprisonment are more, not less, likely to reoffend. There is
nothing surprising about this. Imprisonment immerses people in inmate
subcultures and exposes them to the deviant values of chronic offenders.
Many prisons are brutal and brutalizing places to which prisoners must
accommodate for self-protection. Almost all prisons are resource-poor
and unable to provide adequate drug, mental health, and other treatment,
vocational training, and education programs that can help prisoners lead
law-abiding lives later on.
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Imprisonment worsens prisoners’ physical and mental health and shortens their life expectancies. The resulting stigma and collateral legal consequences foreclose opportunities and access to resources that make their
later lives more difﬁcult, their employment prospects worse, and their lifetime earnings less. Imprisonment damages and often impoverishes prisoners’ families and children.
Nothing I have written here is new, controversial, or likely to surprise
knowledgeable professionals or other well-informed people. Most of it
has been known for decades, some for centuries.
8. PAROLE RELEASE.—Except in the handful of states that have effective systems of presumptive sentencing guidelines, parole release is an essential
component of a just and cost-effective sentencing system in the United
States.
Parole release has been the missing component of American sentencing reform since the late 1970s.9 Its absence has been a huge loss. Welldesigned and managed parole systems provide important capacities. They
can establish and implement rational, evidenced-based release policies.
They can even out disparities in the lengths of prison sentences judges impose. They can attempt to address prison overcrowding and control corrections costs by adjusting release standards. They can tailor supervision
and conditions to individual parolees’ needs. Not least, they give prisoners
hope of an early release and motivation to achieve it.
The usefulness of parole release has been ignored for 40 years. In
20 states and the federal system, it was abolished. A few states later reestablished it. In states that retained parole release, parole boards stopped
performing their traditional roles.
In retrospect, parole’s problem is that important developments occurred during a transition period. Parole release guidelines were a harbinger of the sentencing reform movement, a response to concerns about
inconsistency, lack of ofﬁcial accountability, and racial and other dispar-

9
The literature on parole release is scanty except for recidivism studies (e.g., Petersilia
and Rosenfeld 2008). Few researchers or policy analysts have been interested since it fell
out of favor. Petersilia (1999) is the most comprehensive survey of parole policy issues.
Gottfredson, Wilkins, and Hoffman (1978) document early parole reforms and the development of evidence-based release guidelines. Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1981) reports the
results of an evaluation of the ﬁrst, largely successful, parole guidelines systems.
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ities that undermined indeterminate sentencing. That is why I described
their development in the introduction as one plausible beginning of modern sentencing reform efforts. To many critics, however, parole release
was the paradigm institution of indeterminate sentencing. Ironically,
evaluations showed that the best early parole guidelines systems successfully reduced disparities and improved accountability. That evidence made
no difference. Oregon, Minnesota, and the federal system abandoned
successful parole guidelines systems in the 1980s.
After the mid-1980s, parole boards became highly risk averse; most
still are. Few, if any, tried to control prison populations. The percentages
of prisoners released fell sharply. Average times served before release increased. The numbers held until their sentences expired ballooned. The
numbers returned to prison for breach of conditions skyrocketed.
Elected ofﬁcials deserve most of the blame. Especially during the toughon-crime period from 1980 to 2000, but also more recently, governors
made it clear they did not want to be associated with “parole leniency.”
In one of the best-known incidents, liberal Democratic Massachusetts
governor Deval Patrick demanded that the entire parole board resign after a notorious crime by a parolee; releases under the new board, headed
by a conservative former prosecutor, plummeted. Notorious crimes by
parolees are inevitable, however, even in the best system. Auto accidents
and bathtub slips are also inevitable, but no one suggests we should stop
using cars or bathing. In earlier times in US history, governors and parole
boards expressed deep sorrow about crimes by parolees. Life went on.
Parole boards can do a number of things better than any alternative.
Modern prediction instruments, for example, include “dynamic” factors,
things that treatment programs can change and that make future success
on and after parole more likely. Judges cannot know about those future
changes when they impose sentences.
Parole boards can use release guidelines to even out disparities, especially gross ones, in sentences judges impose. In almost all states, no other
mechanism exists to do that. Except for a handful of states with presumptive sentencing guidelines, meaningful systems of appellate sentence review are nonexistent. Even in that handful of states, successful appeals are
rare. Part of the reason is that prosecutors often require defendants to
waive any appeal rights as a condition of a plea bargain.
Parole boards cannot prevent prison overcrowding in periods like the
1980s and 1990s, when imprisonment rates doubled and redoubled, but
they can ameliorate the increases. In stable periods, their ability to ad-

22

Michael Tonry

vance release dates can make the difference between operating within a
system’s capacity and exceeding it. This was a standard function of parole
release in earlier times. Even earlier, governors commonly used their
pardon powers to control the size of the prison population.
No plausible arguments have been made against parole release. No
other institution can release people because they have changed in important ways or can even out sentencing disparities. Demagogic arguments
against parole release center on “leniency,” but demagoguery is morally
irrelevant. Romantic arguments are made that judges, not bureaucrats,
should determine sentences, but that ignores three realities. Judges seldom know much about defendants; they rarely receive comprehensive
presentence investigation reports. They know less about individuals than
parole authorities can. In any case, prosecutors through their charging
and bargaining decisions, not judges, control most sentences for moderately serious and serious crimes. And, as a practical matter, unjust decisions by judges are usually irremediable.
It is possible that parole release authority is unnecessary in states that
have presumptive sentencing guidelines. That could be true, but only if
meaningful opportunities exist to appeal sentences. Given that prosecutors have the same powers in those states as everywhere else and that successful appeals are rare, meaningful appeal opportunities are unlikely.10 A
solution is for parole boards and sentencing commissions to promulgate
identical guidelines. If judges impose sentences from within the applicable guideline ranges, parole boards would seldom have reason to release
prisoners early. If judges impose sentences longer than the applicable
range indicates, parole boards would normally set a release date within
the range.
A critic might fairly say that I have described aspirations for parole release rather than accomplishments (e.g., Frase 2019). Parole boards have
long been demoralized, underfunded, and risk averse. Parole board members are too often political appointees, serving at the governor’s pleasure,

10
The Model Penal Code—Sentencing offers a number of proposals to reinvigorate sentence appeals, including authorizing appellate judges to overturn disproportionately severe
sentences (including those resulting from mandatory sentence laws) and to take a “second
look” at the need for continued conﬁnement of prisoners who have served 15 or more
years (Reitz and Klingele 2019). The code has not, however, been enacted anywhere
and does not address the problem that prosecutors often insist that defendants waive appeal rights as a condition of plea bargains.
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and often lack appropriate professional expertise. Those things were not
true in the best parole systems in the 1970s and need not be true in the
future. Blueprints are available to guide development and reinvigoration
of parole boards so that they can operate systems for implementing rational evidence-based release policies, reducing disparities in sentences
judges impose, and ameliorating prison overcrowding (Rhine, Petersilia,
and Reitz 2017).
9. LUCK AND LEADERSHIP.—Some sentencing systems and policies are demonstrably superior to others. Whether they are successful often depends, alas,
on auspicious circumstances and the involvement of unusually effective
leaders.
On a cosmic report card, the sentencing reform movement of the last
half century deserves a low or failing grade. The initial aims were to reduce disparities, make processes fairer, and in Judge Frankel’s terms bring
the rule of law to sentencing. Credible evidence of reduction in disparities
exists only for a few initiatives and a few states. During the tough-oncrime period, the 1980s and 1990s, the aims of mandatory minimum and
similar laws were ostensibly to reduce crime and increase “uniformity.”
They had few, if any, crime reduction effects and increased disparities.
Proliferation of mandatory minimums and resulting increases in prosecutorial power have made processes less fair, sentences less consistent,
and efforts to improve fairness, consistency, and accountability less successful.
In most places, the rule of law is no more evident today in sentencing
than it was 50 years ago. The core elements are established and knowable
rules, fair procedures, impartial decision makers, and opportunities for
review of initial decisions. Of these, only the requirement of an impartial
decision maker is generally satisﬁed. Less than a third of states have sentencing guidelines. Most cases everywhere are resolved by plea bargaining, a process few would describe as fair, transparent, or accountable.
Appeals of sentence are meaningfully available only in four or ﬁve jurisdictions, and they are not common there. Even that picture is a bit rosy.
Many guidelines systems have had few or no general effects on sentencing in general or on disparities.
Table 2 summarizes major changes in state sentencing systems since
1970; the federal government enacted all of them. Three patterns stand
out. Legislatures enacted many more mandatory minimum sentence and
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TABLE 2
Major State Sentencing Reforms
Total

Pre1970

1970–
79

1980–
89

1990–
99

2000–
2009

Post2009

Mandatory
minimumsa

50

Unknown

49

Many

Many

Some

A few

Three-strikesb

27

None

None

None

24

3

Truth in sentencingc

29

1

None

2

26

Life without parole

49

7

12

11

16

4

Sentencing
commissiond

16

None

2

9

10 [24]

1 [21]

5

None

None

4

3

[22]

19

None

None

10

10 [21]

2 [21]

Initiative

Presumptive
guidelines
Any state guidelinesd

[21]

[21]

SOURCE.—Three-strikes: Chen (2008); truth in sentencing: Sabol et al. (2002); sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines: Frase (2019, table 1); life without parole:
Ogletree and Sarat (2012); mandatory minimums: Shane-Dubow, Brown, and Olsen
(1985); Tonry (2016, table 2.2).
a

After 1979, innumerable mandatory sentence laws were enacted and amended, making
decadal counts nearly impossible. The 1970–79 laws mostly required 1- or 2-year sentence
enhancements, often for use of a gun in the underlying crime.
b

Earlier habitual offender laws, mostly enacted in the 1920s and 1930s, targeted chronic
property offenders; people sentenced to imprisonment were usually eligible for parole release.
c

Jurisdictions qualifying for prison construction funds under the federal Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
d

Totals refer to status in 2018 and include District of Columbia. Annual accounts show

adoptions and in brackets repeals. Totals are adoptions less repeals.

similar laws than sentencing guidelines laws, mostly in the 1980s and
1990s. Except in Michigan in 2003 for most drug offenses, no signiﬁcant
mandatory minimum sentence laws have been repealed. By contrast, a
quarter of all sentencing commissions went out of business, two of the
seven presumptive guidelines systems were converted to voluntary systems, and three of the 22 guidelines jurisdictions terminated their use.
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Table 2 understates the fragility of sentencing commissions. A number created in the 1980s failed to develop guidelines, and several, most
famously in New York, were unable to persuade legislatures to approve
their proposals (von Hirsch, Knapp, and Tonry 1987; Griset 1991).
Table 2 explains the failing or near-failing grade on the cosmic report
card. However, some sentencing policy initiatives have worked reasonably well and a few jurisdictions in recent decades, most famously California, have pulled back from the worst excesses of the tough-on-crime
period. Four lessons can be drawn.
First, some policy initiatives can make sentencing fairer, more predictable, and more consistent. The presumptive sentencing guidelines systems in Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington reduced
sentencing disparities, including racial disparities, achieved compliance
with changed policies, established meaningful systems of appellate sentence review, and improved corrections systems’ planning and budgeting. Those things probably also happened in Kansas, but there is less evidence. North Carolina’s guidelines reduced prison population growth
more successfully there than occurred in any other state. Some of the voluntary guidelines systems, notably in Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, are widely said to have achieved legitimacy in judges’ eyes and to
have improved consistency in those states (though sophisticated evaluations have not demonstrated this). Those three states have institutionalized competent commissions that regularly revise their guidelines, maintain extensive data systems, and provide impact projections concerning
proposed legislation. So, some successes.
Second, it is vastly harder to achieve the political support needed to enact sentencing commission legislation and to develop, promulgate, and
oversee implementation of successful guidelines than it is to enact mandatory sentence and similar laws. That is not surprising. Proponents of
those laws tend to have little compassion or concern for offenders, not
to think or much care about implementation issues, and to have personal,
political, and ideological objectives in mind. Enactment of the proposed
laws achieves those objectives. The supporting rhetoric often insists that
the goal is to prevent victim suffering; who could possibly be against that?
That so few mandatory sentence laws have been repealed is also not
surprising. Their human costs are borne by offenders. State and local
agencies pay any operations costs. There is no easy way to show that a
particular law is ineffective, especially to politicians who distrust research
ﬁndings and know intuitively that deterrence and incapacitation work.
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Vocal opposition comes from civil liberties and ex-prisoners groups, defense lawyers, and sometimes judges, but they carry less weight than police and prosecutors, victims’ organizations, and conservative activists.
Sentencing and parole commissions, by contrast, are continuing targets. Individual judges, prosecutors’ organizations, and victims’ groups
usually oppose their creation and favor their expiration. They require
state funding, and opponents can propose to save money by closing them
down. Unlike a mandatory sentence law, a guidelines commission can be
palpably ineffective. The leadership may be politically ineffective, important constituencies may disapprove policy choices, and the guidelines
may fail to achieve legitimacy in practitioners’ eyes.
Third, despite all that, some guidelines systems have succeeded and
survived. Some other major reform initiatives, notably California’s “Realignment” to date, have succeeded. There are few policy histories of successful sentencing initiatives.11 All stress the commitment of politically
savvy leaders and unusually able senior staff. In Oregon, longtime Republican Attorney General Hardy Myers supported the enabling legislation for the commission and guidelines and ran continuous political
interference. In Washington, Republican District Attorney Norm Maleng of King County (Seattle) was the godfather; his former deputy David
Boerner (later the commission’s longtime chair) and executive director
Roxanne Lieb made the trains run on time. Judge, then Justice, then
Chief Justice Douglas Amdahl provided the political weight in Minnesota and commission executive directors Dale Parent and Kay Knapp
produced a ﬁrst-rate product. Judge Thomas Ross as commission chair
did the heavy lifting in North Carolina. And so on.
Unusually effective individuals were also behind the successful parole
guidelines systems. The federal prototype resulted in part from a decade’s work by Don M. Gottfredson and Leslie T. Wilkins, formerly
head of corrections research in the UK Home Ofﬁce, and in part from
the support of Maurice Sigler, chair of the Federal Parole Board. The
key person in developing Oregon’s successful parole guidelines was Parole Board chair Ira Blalock. In Minnesota, it was the parole board’s chief
executive, Dale Parent. Parole guidelines, however, were easier. All of
these people worked at a time when indeterminate sentencing was taken
11
Martin (1984), Parent (1988), and Frase (2005) tell the Minnesota story; the Washington story, Boerner and Lieb (2001); North Carolina, Wright (2002); Pennsylvania,
Martin (1984) and Kramer and Ullmer (2009).
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for granted. Parole abolition was on no one’s agenda, judges and prosecutors had no reason to oppose parole reforms, criminal justice policy
was not highly politicized, and reducing disparities and improving efﬁciency were uncontroversial ambitions.
The most dramatic sentencing reform story of our time is California’s
work in progress Realignment. The story Robert Weisberg (2019) tells
includes many important players—prison reform litigators who kept at
it for two decades, determined activist groups who launched successful
referenda, three federal district court judges who stayed the course—
but centers on Governor Jerry Brown. During two terms as governor,
Brown repeatedly spent political capital, successfully managed the legislature, and stimulated referenda that made the difference. Realignment
is not perfect and may in the end fail, but for now California sentencing
is in better shape than it has been for 40 years. You will have to read the
story to learn the details.
Fourth, prevailing ways of thinking change. As recently as the 1960s,
few people challenged indeterminate sentencing. Emphasizing rehabilitation of offenders made sense to almost everyone. The American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code (1962) and three high-proﬁle national commissions in 1967, 1971, and 1973 endorsed it wholeheartedly.12 That is a
major reason why parole commissions had easier law reform jobs than
sentencing commissions. The latter came into being after indeterminate
sentencing imploded but also when tough-on-crime politics was in full
swing: rehabilitation and sympathetic concern for offenders were out;
deterrence, incapacitation, and do the crime, do the time were in. That
Hardy Myers, Norm Maleng, Doug Amdahl, and Tom Ross superintended substantial guidelines successes during that period is in retrospect
remarkable. They marched their commissions into the prevailing winds
and somehow overcame the political obstacles on which most sentencing
commissions foundered.
The tough-on-crime period is not completely past, but its inﬂuence is
waning. Liberal and conservative movements, the ACLU and Right on
Crime, and totemic liberal and conservative activists, George Soros and
the Koch brothers, ﬁnd law reform common cause. Legislatures mostly
stopped enacting new mandatory sentence laws two decades ago. Some
12
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967),
National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (1971), and National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973).
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legislatures have whittled away at them though not yet repealed them.
That shift in the zeitgeist may partly explain California’s successes.
Changes may be possible in many states that were not able to make them
one or two decades ago. If so, lessons have been learned about what does
and does not work that may be helpful if fairness, consistency, and accountability reappear on sentencing reform agendas.
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